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Abstract. Convolutional neural network (CNN) has surpassed traditional meth-
ods for medical image classification. However, CNN is vulnerable to adversari-
al attacks which may lead to disastrous consequences in medical applications. 
Although adversarial noises are usually generated by attack algorithms, white-
noise-induced adversarial samples can exist, and therefore the threats are real. 
In this study, we propose a novel training method, named IMA, to improve the 
robustness of CNN against adversarial noises. During training, the IMA method 
increases the margins of training samples in the input space, i.e., moving CNN 
decision boundaries far away from the training samples to improve robustness. 
The IMA method is evaluated on four publicly available datasets under strong 
100-PGD white-box adversarial attacks, and the results show that the proposed 
method significantly improved CNN classification accuracy on noisy data while 
keeping a relatively high accuracy on clean data. We hope our approach may 
facilitate the development of robust applications in medical field. 
Keywords: Robustness, CNN, Medical image classification. 
1 Introduction 
Convolutional neural network (CNN) has become the first choice for automated med-
ical image analysis due to its superior performance. However, recent studies have 
shown that they are susceptible to adversarial attacks which add noises to input, and 
the input perturbation could be imperceptible to human eyes [1]. The threats of adver-
sarial noises to medial image analysis have been revealed by several studies [2]–[5] in 
previous MICCAI. It is argued that adversarial noises are created by algorithms, not 
random noises, and may not exist in the real world. However, on the OCT image da-
taset, we found that ~3% of the noisy samples generated from uniform noise distribu-
tion on the noise level of 0.05, can cause ResNet-18 to make wrong classification of 
OCT images, which suggests that white-noise-induced adversarial samples can exist. 
For medical applications, ~3% is not a negligible number, and it is clearly worth de-
veloping methods to improve CNN adversarial robustness. A general and effective 
strategy is adversarial training [1], and the basic idea is to add noises to the training 
samples by using adversarial attacks (e.g. PGD [6]). Through adversarial training, the 
network can learn from adversarial samples and change decision boundary so that it 
will become difficult to push the input across the decision boundary by adding a small 
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amount of noise. Adversarial training is straightforward but computationally expen-
sive. Thus, one needs to make sure that the generated noisy samples can indeed help 
to improve robustness: samples with too much noise can harm performance. 
We propose a novel method, Increasing-Margin Adversarial (IMA) Training, to 
improve robustness of deep neural networks for classification tasks. Our method aims 
to increase margins of training samples (margin is the distance to decision boundary 
in the input space), i.e., moving decision boundary far away from the training samples 
to improve robustness. We evaluated our method on four datasets with 100-PGD 
white-box attack and the results show that our proposed method can achieve a signifi-
cant improvement in CNN robustness against adversarial noises.  
2 Methodology 
2.1 Increasing-Margin Adversarial (IMA) Training  
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IMA training process includes two alternating sub-processes: Algorithm 1 to compute 
IMA loss and update the CNN model, and Algorithm 2 to update margin estimation. 
In Algorithm 1, by minimizing the IMA loss on clean and noisy samples, the model 
will try to reach a balance between robustness and accuracy. In Algorithm 2, the sam-
ple margins are updated and recorded after each epoch. These estimated margins are 
used to generate noisy samples for training the model in the next epoch. Our IMA 
method tries to generate noisy samples on decision boundaries as much as possible: 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
         
        
  
  
  
   
Fig. 1(a). B-PGD (case-0) Fig. 1(b). B-PGD (case-1) Fig. 2. Binary search 
  
 
    
     
 
    
         
           
       
          
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
      
  
3 
adding too much noise to a training sample may significantly reduce accuracy, but 
adding too little noise may have no effect on improving robustness. We developed 
Binary-search PGD (B-PGD in Algorithm 3, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) to find noisy samples 
on decision boundaries. At the very beginning of the IMA training process, the mar-
gins of the training samples are initialized to a small number equal to margin expan-
sion size in Algorithm 2. During IMA training, the margin of a training sample keeps 
increasing as if a ball is expanding (the ball center is the sample 𝑥, and the radius is 
the margin 𝜀 𝑥 ;              ε-ball), until the ball of the sample collides with the ball 
of another sample in a different class. When the two balls collide and therefore a local 
decision boundary is formed, Algorithm 2 will prevent them from further expansion 
by shrinking margins (Fig. 3). In the next section, we will show that an equilibrium 
state (Fig. 4) may exist under which the input margins of the samples are maximized.  
2.2 The existence of equilibrium 
We choose Cross-Entropy loss for classification. We can show that on certain condi-
tions, an equilibrium state (Fig. 4) exists under which the margins of the samples are 
maximized. To simplify the discussion, we assume there are three classes and three 
decision boundaries between classes (Fig. 5). The softmax output of the neural net-
work model 𝑓 𝑥  has three components: 𝑃1 , 𝑃2  and 𝑃3  corresponding to the three 
classes. If a point (i.e. a data sample) 𝑥 is on the decision boundary between Class-1 
and Class-2, then 𝑃1 𝑥  𝑃2 𝑥 . The mathematical expectation of the cross-entropy 
loss of the noisy samples (𝐿3 in Algorithm 1) in two classes is  
E  𝐄𝑋𝑛∈𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠1 (−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃1 𝑋𝑛 )) + 𝐄𝑋𝑛∈𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠2 (−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃2 𝑋𝑛 ))                (1) 
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Given a large noise level ε𝑛, the IMA method puts the noisy samples on the decision 
boundaries. If noisy samples (random variables) 𝑋𝑛 ∈ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠1  and 𝑋𝑛 ∈ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠2  have 
the same spatial distribution on the decision boundary (denoted by B) between the 
two classes, then Eq.(1) can be simplified to 
    E  𝐄𝑋𝑛∈ 𝐵 (−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃1 𝑋𝑛 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃2 𝑋𝑛 ))  −𝐄𝑋𝑛∈ 𝐵 (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃1 𝑋𝑛 𝑃2 𝑋𝑛 ))                                     
≥ 𝐄𝑋𝑛∈ 𝐵 (−𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃1 𝑋𝑛 +𝑃2 𝑋𝑛 
2
)
2
)                                                                         (2) 
E reaches the minimum when 𝑃1 𝑋𝑛  𝑃2 𝑋𝑛 .  
The analysis shows that the loss of noisy samples will increase if the decision 
boundaries (i.e. the model 𝑓 𝑥 ) change a little bit from the current state. Thus, when 
the loss  𝐿1 + 𝐿2  on clean data is minimized and noisy samples are on the decision 
boundaries, an equilibrium is reached under the assumption that noisy samples have 
the same spatial distribution on the decision boundaries between classes. This analysis 
provides the rationale that our IMA method puts the noisy samples on decision 
boundaries as much as possible, which is significantly different from the theory of the 
MMA algorithm [7]. If the assumption does not hold, then some oscillations of deci-
sion boundaries are expected during training, but the experiment results show that 
sample margins can still be increased, compared to those trained only on clean data. 
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3 Experiment 
We applied the proposed IMA method for four CNNs on four datasets (ECG, Fash-
ion-MNIST, SVHN and OCT) and used 100-PGD to evaluate their robustness. PGD 
is the strongest first-order white-box attack, and 100 is the number of PGD iterations. 
To further enhance the attack during model testing, each 100-PGD runs twice. To 
describe the CNNs, we use "COV (a, b, c, d, e)" to represent a convolution layer with 
"a" input channels, "b" output channels, kernel size of "c", stride of "d" and padding 
of "e"; "Linear (f, g)" to denote a linear layer with input size of "f" and output size of 
"g"; "MP" to denote max-pooling with kernel size of 2; "BN" to denote batch normal-
ization; "LR" to denote leaky ReLU. 
To obtain the baseline performance, each CNN was trained with Cross-entropy loss 
on clean data, which is denoted as "ce". To evaluate the performance, we compare our 
proposed method with the other four adversarial training methods, including: (1) 20-
PGD-based Standard Adversarial Training with noise level 𝜖, denoted as "adv 𝜖", and 
the loss function is in [8]; (2) Decoupled Direction and Norm Attack [9], denoted as 
"DDN"; (3) Instance Adaptive Adversarial Training [10], denoted as "IAAT"; (4) 
adversarial training with TRdeoff-inspired Adversarial DEfense via Surrogate-loss 
minimization (TRADES) [11], denoted as "TRADE". 
3.1 ECG 
We used PhysioNet MIT-BIH Arrhythmia ECG Dataset [12] containing 109446 ECG 
heartbeat records in 5 classes/categories. The dataset has been divided into a training 
set (87554 samples) and a testing set (21892 samples), which is publicly available.  
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We further divided the training set into a "pure" training set (70043 samples, 80%) 
and a validation set (17511 samples, 20%). The dataset has a large imbalance between 
classes, and we performed up-sampling to ensure that there are the same number of 
samples in each class in the training set. Testing set remains the same. CNN structure 
for ECG classification is COV(1, 32, 5, 2, 2) -LR-COV(32, 32, 5, 2, 2)-LR-COV(32, 
32, 5 ,2 ,2)-LR-COV(32, 32, 5, 2, 2)-LR-Linear(384, 128)-LR-Linear(128, 128)-LR-
Linear(128, 128)-LR-Linear(128, 5). Based on the performance on validation set, we 
set β to 0.5 in Algorithm 1. 𝑁𝑃𝐺𝐷  is 20 for Algorithm 1 and 50 for Algorithm 2. 
𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦  is 10. 𝜀𝑛 is set to the maximum noise level (i.e. 0.3 for L-infinity norm, 1.5 
for L2 norm). 𝛿 is 𝜀𝑛 divided by the number of epochs. For every method, the number 
of epochs is 60, optimizer is Adam, and learning rate is 0.001. 
 To measure robustness on the test set, adversarial noises on different levels (meas-
ured by L-infinity or L2 norm) are added. Under L-infinity norm-based attack (Fig. 
6), our method "IMA" is better than the compared methods in general, and it can be 
seen that the model trained by "adv 𝜖" only behaves well around noise level 𝜖. "IMA" 
can keep a high accuracy on clean data (about 90%), while improving the robustness 
of CNN. Under L2 norm based attack (Fig. 7), our proposed method has the best per-
formance in general.  
3.2 Fashion-MNIST 
We used Fashion-MNIST (FM) dataset. The structure of CNN is COV(1, 32, 3, 1, 1) -
LR-MP-COV(32, 64, 3, 1, 1)-LR-MP-Linear(7×7×64, 1024)-LR-Linear(1024, 10). 
The IMA parameters are the same as those for ECG. Under L-infinity norm based 
attack (Fig. 8), our proposed method outperformed the compared methods in general. 
Also, "IMA" can keep a high accuracy on clean data (more than 85%), while improv-
ing the robustness of CNN. Under L2 norm based attack (Fig. 9), IMA also has the 
best performance in general. 
3.3 SVHN 
We used SVHN dataset, and the structure of CNN is COV(3, 32, 3, 1, 1) -BN-ReLU-
COV(32, 32, 3, 1, 1)-BN-ReLU-MP-COV(32, 64, 3, 1, 1)-BN-ReLU-COV(64, 64, 3,  
    
Fig. 6. ECG Linf Fig. 7. ECG L2 Fig. 8. FM Linf Fig. 9. FM L2 
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 1, 1)-BN-ReLU-MP-COV(64, 128, 3, 1, 1)-BN-ReLU-COV(128, 128, 3, 1, 1) -BN-
ReLU-MP-COV(128, 256, 3, 1, 0)-BN-ReLU-MP-Linear(256, 10). IMA parameters 
are the same as those for ECG. The results of L-infinity and L2 norm-based attacks 
are shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively. IMA overperformed the compared 
methods except for "adv 6" which is as good as IMA. However, to use standard ad-
versarial training "adv ϵ", the user needs to choose the value of ϵ, assuming that each 
data sample has roughly the same margin which may not be true for every dataset. It 
was lucky that ϵ  6 (6/255) was chosen in the experiment, and we can see "adv 2" 
and "adv 10" are not so lucky. IMA can keep a high accuracy in the classification of 
clean data (more than 90%), while improving the robustness of CNN. Since the mar-
gins of the data samples are relatively small, there is no obvious difference between 
"DDN" and IMA. We note that "DDN" can only handle L2 norm-based attack. 
3.4 OCT 
Retinal optical coherence tomography (OCT) dataset [13] has four classes. Images 
were resized to 224×224. 1000 samples per class were randomly selected to obtain a 
training set of 4000 samples. The test set stays unchanged. ResNet-18 with instance 
normalization was used. To reduce computation cost, we run Algorithm 2 after three 
training epochs of Algorithm 1. The IMA parameters are similar to those for ECG, 
except that β is 0.01 in Algorithm 1 and 𝛿 is  × 𝜀𝑛/the number of epochs. Optimizer 
is Adamax for every method. Under L-infinity norm-based attack (Fig. 12), only IMA 
can keep a high accuracy in the classification of clean data (about 90%), while im-
proving CNN robustness. Under the L2 norm-based attack, IMA has the highest clean 
accuracy among the defense methods. "adv ϵ" is sensitive to the value of ϵ, and the 
underline assumption of every sample having the same margin is not generally true. 
4 Conclusion 
In this study, we proposed a novel Increasing-Margin Adversarial (IMA) Training 
method to improve the robustness of CNN for classification. Our method aims to 
increase margin for each of the training samples to improve CNN robustness against 
adversarial attacks. The experiment results show that our method significantly im-
proved CNN classification accuracy on noisy data while keeping a relatively high 
    
Fig. 10. SVHN Linf Fig. 11. SVHN L2 Fig. 12. OCT Linf Fig. 13. OCT L2 
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accuracy on clean data. We hope our approach may facilitate the development of 
robust classification solutions in medical field. We will release the code when the 
paper is published. 
(Note: since the code of MMA [7] was released only a couple of weeks before MICCAI dead-
line, we do not have sufficient time to read the code and evaluate it.) 
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